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Provigil: A Case Study of
Anticompetitive Behavior
by MICHAEL A. CARRIER*
I. Introduction
Using the sleep-disorder drug Provigil as a case study, this article
exposes a new type of anticompetitive harm that stems from the
combination of two distinct activities. First, brand-name drug firms
such as Cephalon, the developer of Provigil, have settled patent
litigation by paying generic firms to delay entering the market.
Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have
engaged in "product hopping," switching from one means of
administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule). The
story of Provigil demonstrates the anticompetitive harm that can
result from the combination of these two activities.
II. Provigil
Provigil is a sleep-disorder medication marketed by Cephalon. It
was initially approved for excessive daytime sleepiness associated
with narcolepsy and was subsequently used to treat obstructive sleep
apnea and shift work sleep disorder. United States soldiers, most
famously those fighting in the Iraq War, have used it to stay awake
2for as long as 40 hours at a time.
The drug offers significant benefits over other amphetamine-like
stimulants. In particular, Provigil does not result in side effects such
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. Copyright @ 2011
Michael A. Carrier. I would like to thank participants in the AALS 2011 Annual Meeting
session on Antitrust and Economic Regulation for helpful comments. This Article is
adapted from Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:
The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2010).
1. Complaint for Injunctive Relief 26, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-0244), 2008 WL 446785 [hereinafter Cephalon Complaint].
2. Tom Spears, New Drug May Help Soldiers Stay Awake Doctors Unsure of Long-
Term Effect, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Oct. 11, 2003), http://www.modafinil.com/article/soldiers.
html.
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as addiction, feeling jittery, and crashing afterward. As a result, the
drug is considered the "gold standard" for the treatment of the
excessive sleepiness accompanying sleep disorders. United States
sales of Provigil increased from $25 million in 1999 to $475 million in
2005 to $800 million in 2007.'
The active ingredient in Provigil is a chemical compound called
modafinil. Cephalon filed a New Drug Application for Provigil in
1996, which the FDA approved in 1998.' The U.S. patent covering
modafinil was issued in 1979 and expired in 2001.
Cephalon obtained a second patent in 1997. This patent covered
a formulation of modafinil that consisted of a specified distribution of
small particles.! This narrower patent lasts until October 2014, with
Cephalon receiving an additional six months of pediatric exclusivity
that extends protection until April 2015.10
Unlike the patent on the compound itself, generic firms could
easily avoid this narrow formulation patent. As a consultant advised
Cephalon in 2002: "[A]ll generic companies know [that the patent]
may be easily circumvented" by manufacturing products to contain a
different distribution of modafinil particle sizes."
Given the ease with which generic firms could circumvent the
particle-size patent, it is no surprise they were eager to do so. In
December 2002, four generic firms submitted Abbreviated New Drug
Applications on the first day the FDA would accept them.12 Teva,
Ranbaxy, Mylan, and Barr each certified "that [their] version[s] of
generic Provigil did not infringe ... [the] [p]atent, that the patent was
invalid, or both.""
3. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, 91 27.
4. Id.
5. Id. 1 28.
6. Id. 1 24.
7. Id. 9 26.
8. Id. 1 32.
9. Id. 9 33.
10. Cephalon Granted Six Months of Pediatric Exclusivity for Provigil(R),
CEPHALON.COM (Mar. 28, 2006), http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml
?mode=year&filterval=2006 (noting that Cephalon "met the terms of a written request to
provide data from clinical studies examining the effect of Provigil in pediatric patients")
(emphasis omitted).




Cephalon "knew that generic Provigil entry would lead to
substantial declines in the company's revenues." 4 A company vice
president projected a 75%-90% price reduction that would lower
revenues by more than $400 million (nearly 75% of the drug's annual
sales) within one year." Similarly, Teva projected that generic
versions "would garner 90[%] of all modafinil prescriptions within a
month" and that the price would fall to 10% of Provigil's price within
16
one year.
The consensus in the industry supported these projections. Wall
Street analysts projected generic entry in 2006." The four first-filing
generic firms planned for a launch in June 2006 at the latest.18 Barr
ordered significant quantities of the active ingredient in late 2005.9
And Cephalon asserted, in November 2005, that "generic versions of
modafinil" would enter the market in the middle of 2006.20
Cephalon fought back against these projections by seeking to
maintain its market share through a successor product, Nuvigil. 2' The
longer-lasting Nuvigil was similar to Provigil in many ways, including
chemical composition.22 It offered modest improvements by allowing
patients to take a pill once a day instead of two times daily. Cephalon
also sought to switch to Nuvigil to expand its customer base to cover
other conditions.23
The FDA, however, had not yet approved Nuvigil by the end of
2005.24 And, as the FTC pointed out, "[T]here was considerable
uncertainty as to whether the FDA would approve Nuvigil early








22. Cephalon Receives FDA Approval of NUVIGIL(TM) for the Treatment of
Excessive Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, CEPHALON.COM (June 18, 2007),
http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml?mode=year&filterval=2007
(pointing out that "[t]he active pharmaceutical ingredient in Nuvigil, armodafinil, is the
longer-lived r-enantiomer [molecule's mirror image] of modafinil, the active ingredient in
Provigil") (emphasis omitted).
23. Cephalon, Inc., Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA.COM (May 5,
2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/135541-cephalon-inc-ql-2009-earnings-call-transcrip
t?page=-1 (discussing clinical trials for jet-lag disorders, bipolar depression, sleep apnea,
co-morbid major depressive disorder, and traumatic brain injury).
24. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, T 52.
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enough in 2006 to enable Cephalon to successfully migrate customers
from Provigil to Nuvigil before the entry of a generic version of
Provigil."25
Given this uncertainty, Cephalon decided to settle patent
litigation with the four first-filing generic firms.26 Cephalon paid more
than $200 million to the four generics to agree to forgo entry until
April 2012.27 The Cephalon CEO conceded that the settlements
provided "six more years of patent protection[,]" which was "$4
billion in sales that no one expected."2
Cephalon was able to attain this windfall by combining two
activities, which are the focus of the next two Parts.
III. Settlements
The first activity involved patent settlements. In recent years,
brand-name drug companies have paid generic firms to settle patent
litigation and delay entering the market. The relevant statutory
framework is the Hatch-Waxman Act, enacted by Congress to solve
problems that existed in the drug industry in the 1980s.2
Most relevant for our purposes, the legislature created a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity, reserved for the first generic to
certify that the brand firm's patent is invalid or not infringed. In
contrast to the purpose of the provision, which was to encourage
patent challenges, the 180-day period has been employed to allow
brand firms to block challenges by settling with the first generic
(known as a "Paragraph IV" generic) to challenge patent validity or
claim noninfringement. 0
By paying the first-filer to delay entering the market, the brand
firm can prevent entry not only by that generic but also by all other
generics, who are prohibited from entering the market until 180 days
after the first-filer's entry." Such settlements are occurring with
increasing frequency since each of the parties benefits from
25. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, T 52.
26. Id. T 53.
27. Id. ' 3.
28. Id. T 4.
29. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
30. The other three Paragraphs apply to generics challenging a drug where there is no
patent on the drug, an expired patent, or a promise to wait until the patent expires. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
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settlement. The brand blocks challenges that could invalidate its
patent, while the generic receives a subset of the brand's monopoly
profits that could exceed what it would have gained by entering the
market.
These settlements threaten severe anticompetitive dangers.
They introduce a type of market division, with the brand firm
blocking all competition for a period of time.32 These so-called
"reverse payments"" are red flags that-given the complex nature of
patent issues in antitrust litigation-frequently offer the best evidence
of patent invalidity or noninfringement." One central element of
patent drug settlements has been the timing of generic entry. Most
generally (and oversimplifying dramatically), the longer the generic
firm agrees to refrain from entering the market, the greater the
anticompetitive concern in some of the early reverse-payment
settlements, the generic agreed to stay out of the market for all or
nearly all of the patent term. For example, in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, generic firm Barr agreed in 1993 not to enter the
market with a generic breast cancer treatment until brand firm
Zeneca's patent expired in 2002.35 And in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, brand firm Bayer in 1997 paid
generic firm Barr to stay out of the market until six months before
Bayer's patent on Cipro, a drug treating bacterial illnesses, was set to
expire in 2003.6
In recent settlements, however, such as the one concerning
Provigil, the parties have provided for generic entry for longer
periods before the end of the term. They presumably have reached
such arrangements to convince courts that several years of
competition before expiration are procompetitive. Cephalon, for
example, touted the "obvious benefits and efficiencies" of its Provigil
settlement, which "permitted the [g]enerics to enter the market three
32. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 WL 22989651, Part II.A (F.T.C. 2003), vacated
by Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
33. These agreements are called reverse payments since they differ from typical
licensing payments that flow from challengers to patentees.
34. In addition, an analysis of the merits of the patent infringement case would be
unreliable. After a case settles, the parties' interests become aligned, with a generic firm
lacking the incentive to vigorously attack a patent's validity or an infringement claim.
Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 73 (2009).
35. 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2006).
36. 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'g, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
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years prior to the expiration of the ... patent."" While such a
position could conceivably apply in the context of the patent that is
the focus of settlement, a closer look at a second activity uncovers
flaws in the argument.
IV. Product Hopping
This second activity, known as "product hopping," involves
switching from one formulation of a drug (e.g., capsule) to another
(e.g., tablet). While product-hopping could offer (frequently minor)
benefits for innovation by increasing patient compliance, it also
threatens adverse effects on generic competition.
A central reason for the adverse effects involves state drug
product selection (DPS) laws. These laws, in effect in all 50 states
today, allow-and in many cases require-pharmacists, absent a
doctor's contrary instructions, to substitute generic versions of brand-
name prescriptions.
DPS laws are designed to address the disconnect in the industry
between prescribing doctors, who are not directly responsive to drug
pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not directly select
the prescribed drug." In particular, DPS laws carve out a role for
pharmacists, who are much more sensitive to prices than doctors.39
Doctors are subject to a vast array of drug promotion, which
includes detailing (sales calls to doctor's offices), direct mailings, free
drug samples, medical journal advertising, sponsored continuing
medical education programs, and media advertising.40 Pharmacists, in
contrast, respond to consumer demand and compete with other
41pharmacies on price.
Reformulation from one version to another eliminates both price
and quality competition. It eliminates quality competition since the
brand firm switches its promotion to the new product, leaving doctors
unable to effectively compare quality between the reformulated
37. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.'s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 1, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-
0244) 2008 WL 2047585.
38. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF
REPORT TO THE FTC 2-3 (1979).
39. BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS7 (1985).
40. STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87-93
(2d ed. 2007).
41. See BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, supra note 39, at 7.
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brand drug and the old version. It also limits price competition by
avoiding the DPS laws.43
The DPS laws typically allow pharmacists to substitute generic
versions of brand drugs only if they are "AB-rated" by the FDA. To
receive an AB rating, a generic drug must be pharmaceutically
equivalent to the brand drug (having the same active ingredient,
form, dosage, strength, and safety and efficacy profile) and also
bioequivalent (being absorbed in the body at roughly the same rate)."
The concern when a brand reformulates its drug is that the
generic version of the first product is not bioequivalent or
pharmaceutically equivalent to the second product. And while the
generic firm may eventually show equivalence, such a showing likely
will not occur for years.45
Compounding this problem, the brand typically will switch its
promotion to the new drug, even highlighting the comparative
advantages of the new product. At the same time, no other party has
the incentive and ability to promote the old product, which leads to
doctors receiving an "entirely one-sided presentation" of the relative
merits of the products."
Product hopping is most successful when brand firms can not
only avoid state DPS laws but also orchestrate effective timing.
Stated most simply, the brand firm will be more successful if it can
switch the market before generic entry.
Introducing the new product before the generic enters the
market "adds the near-elimination of price competition to the near-
elimination of quality competition."47 Brand firms offer the
42. See generally Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 (2009) ("We examine the economic
effect... with special emphasis on identifying the particular dimension of rivalry-price
competition or quality comparisons-that is affected.").
43. Id. at 13-18.
44. FDA CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (30th ed. 2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval
Process/UCM071436.pdf; Shadowen et al., supra note 42, at 5.
45. The delay stems from the generic manufacturer reformulating its product, the
generic firm seeking FDA approval, and delays stemming from a Hatch-Waxman process
that includes a brand firm's automatic "30-month stay" of FDA approval.
46. Shadowen et al., supra note 42, at 46 (explaining that other brands lack the
incentive to promote a competitor's products and that generics will not promote the
product because they do not have large sales forces and would worry about free-riding by
other generics).
47. Id. at 51.
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"uncontested message" of the new product's superiority as the
manufacturer's detailers "extol the virtues of the new product" at a
time when "no one is promoting the original."4 8 In addition, brand
firms make the switch "when doctors do not have a generic
alternative available and do not know that one may be on the way."49
And evidence shows that patients who switch to the new drug are
unlikely to switch back.o For example, in a product-hopping case
involving the cholesterol drug TriCor, brand firm Fournier switched
from a once-daily tablet taken with food to one taken without food.
It conceded that such a change would not have "an expansive effect
[on sales] on its own" but would have "a substantial benefit in
avoiding losses of sales due to generics."" Such a change would allow
Fournier to "sell more than ten times as many TriCor tablets than if
the reformulated product competed head-to-head with the generic
with simultaneous market entry."5 2
In contrast, King Pharmaceuticals, anticipating generic entry on
its ACE inhibitor capsules, switched to a tablet, but not before a
generic brought its capsule to the market. As a result, King's sales
fell from $646 million in 2007 to $166 million in 2008."
V. Combination of Settlements and Product Hopping
In the case at issue here, Cephalon sought to switch the market
from Provigil to Nuvigil before generic Provigil reached the market.
But because the FDA had not yet approved Nuvigil by late 2005, the
only way Cephalon could ensure the absence of generic competition
was by paying the generics not to enter the market. This is exactly
what it did, settling patent litigation with the four first-filing generic
firms to delay entry for six years.54
In its motion to dismiss the complaint (which the court denied),
Cephalon noted that the settlement, which allowed entry in 2012,
"resulted in generic entry years earlier than patent expiration" in
48. Shadowen et al., supra note 42, at 51.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 51-55 (explaining brand firms' marketing of "superior" reformulated
product, generics' lack of marketing, and doctors' "reluctan[ce] to authorize a second
switch of the patient's medication within a relatively short period of time").
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 50-51. For other examples of the effects discussed in this and the previous
paragraph, see id. at 48-58.
54. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, 11 52, 53.
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2015." This is typical of arguments voiced by proponents of recent
reverse-payment settlements, who justify the agreements by pointing
to the guaranteed years of competition before the end of the patent
term.
A bird's-eye view of the activity, however, shows how the various
forms of anticompetitive behavior fit together. Cephalon had no
intention of competing in a robust market with generics in 2012. The
generics themselves, in obtaining more than $200 million from
Cepahlon, did not expect vibrant competition in 2012.
Rather, by delaying the potential onset of generic competition
until 2012, Cephalon bought itself a period of six years in which it was
guaranteed that its weak Provigil patent would not be challenged.
With that certainty in hand, Cephalon could enjoy the luxury of an
extended period of switching the market to its new sleep disorder
drug, Nuvigil. Nuvigil, which the FDA approved in 2007, enjoys
patent protection until 2023." A Cephalon spokesman conceded that
after settlement "[t]he pressure is not what it was," and that the
company was not required "to make a quick transition from Provigil
to Nuvigil."" An industry analyst agreed that the delay would "allow
Cepahlon to seek to expand its wakefulness franchise" rather than
treating Nuvigil "merely as a conversion opportunity ... that would
be under pressure to establish itself early."
Cepahlon's switching strategy had two simple components:
making Provigil less desirable and making Nuvigil more desirable.
Cephalon accomplished the first task by increasing the price of
Provigil by 74 percent between 2004 and 2008 and ceasing promotion
of the drug." Cephalon officials explained that they "actually pulled
all promotion from Provigil" after the first quarter of 2009 "in
anticipation of the [Nuvigil] launch," which occurred in June."
Having weakened the competitive position of Provigil, Cepahlon
set off on its second task: promoting Nuvigil. The CEO sang Nuvigil's
55. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 37, at 26.
56. Cephalon Receives FDA Approval Of Nuvigil(TM) for the Treatment of Excessive
Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, MEDICALNEwSTODAY.COM (June 19, 2007),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/74585.php.
57. Robert Steyer, Cephalon Puts Worries to Rest, THESTREET.COM (July 14, 2006),
http://www.thestreet.com/print/story/10268224.html.
58. Cephalon, Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 23.
59. Jonathan D. Rockoff, How a Drug Maker Tries to Outwit Generics, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 2008, at Bl.
60. Cephalon, Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 23.
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praises: "With an extensive clinical program supporting Nuvigil, and a
patent that extends to 2023, we believe that Nuvigil will be a very
successful product that will ultimately benefit more patients than
Provigil."" And the company brought out the heavy promotion
artillery: "Our sales force is trained and performing all the necessary
pre-launch activities to ensure a successful launch." 62 As soon as
Cephalon brought Nuvigil to the market, "close to 800 salespeople
[could] be out there" selling it.
Divulging little about its role in increasing Provigil's price,
Cephalon played coy, stating that it was "particularly pleased to offer
Nuvigil at a discount to Provigil."6 3  Of course, given Provigil's
methodically increasing costs and the guaranteed lack of generic entry
until 2012, it was only natural that insurers and health-plan managers
would switch patients to Nuvigil.
The certainty, of course, pleased Cephalon shareholders, not to
mention the four generics that were assured they would share in the
bounty. But it flies in the face of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was
designed to encourage patent challenges, as opposed to agreements
not to challenge patents.
VI. Conclusion
In 2006, Cephalon faced imminent generic entry on Provigil.
The generics had a strong claim that they did not infringe Cephalon's
narrow formulation patent. And there was no guarantee that the
FDA would approve its successor drug Nuvigil before generic
versions of Provigil entered the market.
Cephalon knew that it would significantly benefit if it could
switch the market before generic entry. And so it paid the generic
companies not to enter the market. These settlements bought
Cephalon enough time to switch the market to Nuvigil, comfortable
in the certainty that the generic firms would not even attempt to
defeat its patent in court.
Without these settlements, the generics would have flooded the
market with their versions of Provigil and undermined Cephalon's
ability to switch the market from Provigil to Nuvigil. It was only
61. Cephalon, Inc., Q4 2008 Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA.COM (Feb. 13,
2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/120423-cephalon-inc-q4-2008-earnings-call-tran
script?page=-1.
62. Cephalon, Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 23.
63. Id.
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through the subtle combination of settlements and product hopping
that Cephalon was able to subvert the purpose of the Hatch Waxman
Act and achieve "$4 billion in sales that no one expected."6
64. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, 1 4.
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